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Abstract: This paper describes and critically reviews an important but under-theorized value capture
mechanism that we have termed “vertical allocations” (or vertical exactions). This mechanism enables
cities to capture value vertically by allocating floor space for public utilities in privately owned,
mixed-use, vertical development. As a value capture tool, vertical allocations allow the government
to tap value uplift to supply the nearby neighborhood, and the city as a whole, with much needed
public services. The owner or developer is required to make in-kind contributions in the form of
spaces provided for a range of public facilities such as schools, preschools, community centers,
and public medical clinics. While focusing on vertical exactions in Israel we explore how a certain
share of land/floorspace can be allocated for public amenities in a given project. There are several
legal pathways for securing public floorspace including negotiated agreements, land readjustment
and expropriation. The findings show that unclear policies and regulations could create frictions
between developers and municipalities, and these raise the nexus question as well as debates about
construction costs and financial contributions developers have to make. Specifically, the paper finds
that while developers often argue that cities should cover the costs of constructing public floorspace,
city officials assert that the costs should be borne by the owners and developers.
Keywords: value capture; policy assessment; vertical development; public amenities; public-private
cooperation
1. Introduction
Land for public use is a vital need in any city [1] (p. 302), which is why government
guidelines and legislation are applied to procure them through various policies such as
land expropriation, consolidation and re-division [2,3]. As land in city centers becomes
increasingly scarce, and growth pushes cities to their limits, allocating land for public
use becomes more challenging and requires new solutions. Examples include progressive
taxation, redefining property rights, incentivizing owners, and introducing value capture
instruments [4,5]. Value capture enables cities to utilize unearned increments, meaning the
increase in property value as a result of government intervention to which a property owner
has not contributed [6]. Statutory planning can create value uplift that can be harnessed
through value capture tools to supply a range of public benefits to the community, including
land for public utilities.
In this critical review we look at a unique value capture mechanism applied in the
Middle East by Israeli cities. Like other value capture processes, the end result is the
supply of public land—or more specifically public floor space—for the benefit of urban
residents [7]. The Israeli case exemplifies a situation where city administrations utilize value
uplift to create vertical communities in high-rise developments in the city center where
land is scarce and prices are relatively high [7,8]. Given the shortage of available land, and
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potentially the absence of any publicly owned land in central neighborhoods of many cities,
densification requires finding spaces for public amenities on privately owned land. These
spaces can be created by vertically allocating floor area in mixed-use developments. We
call this phenomenon “vertical allocations”. For example, a high-rise residential building
may contain public amenities on its ground floor, which is pre-designated for this purpose.
In Israel, these areas are also owned by the public (the city). In the past, given that it was
not customary to mix uses in Israeli cities, municipal public institutions were spread out
horizontally rather than vertically, occupying a vast amount of land area [9]. Today, due
to the depletion of land resources, together with the concern for the city’s functionality,
there is increasingly willingness to rethink how cities provide public amenities in densely
populated cities [7].
This paper describes and critically reviews the practice of vertical allocations (or verti-
cal exactions). Although existing literature has studied value capture, scholarly contribu-
tions have not emphasized the connection between value capture and vertical urbanization.
With respect to vertical allocations, we ask an overarching question: do value capture
instruments take into account the need to create vertical public amenities in the city? Put
differently, are there value capture regulations and policies that facilitate development that
integrates public and private floor space and stacks them on top of each other? Specifically, we
investigate several sub-questions: (1) What are the mechanisms for achieving vertical alloca-
tions, and what are their shortcomings? (2) What are the challenges for implementing vertical
allocations? Additionally, (3) how can future vertical allocation programs be strengthened?
We focus the analysis on Israeli cities that have experimented with vertical value
capture. Local governments tap value uplift to supply the nearby neighborhood, and the
city as a whole, with much needed public services. Oftentimes, in exchange for bonuses for
increasing the density, height and floor-to-area ratio, the owner or developer is required to
make in-kind contributions in the form of spaces provided for a range of public uses. The
city forfeits its ability to expropriate land, and instead, uses negotiated or non-negotiated
pathways to reap the unearned increments. This case is also interesting because of the
many challenges associated with vertical allocations and the bottom-up practice that was
developed by Israeli cities in the face of a statutory lacuna. Other countries facing similar
challenges rapid population growth, increasing property values in urban areas, lack of
sufficient funds to finance public amenities, and scarcity of land –may glean important
lessons from this case study.
2. The Literature on Value Capture, Verticality, and Exactions
2.1. Value Capture and Its Ability to Mobilize Value Uplifts
The theoretical foundation of this paper relies on the growing literature on value
capture. The term refers to a range of policies and regulatory tools designed to tap unearned
increments, value uplift, or improvement in property values [10–12]. The underlying
premise behind the application of these tools is that an owner or developer enjoys value
increases to his/her property that are the result of market fluctuations or the actions and
interventions of public bodies such as local government, zoning boards, and other planning
agencies [13,14]. As such, the government has the moral justification, as well as the power,
to reap some of these values, extract them, and convert them into cash, in-kind services, or
other public goods. The literature deals with a range of value capture instruments including
betterment levies, land readjustment, impact fees, exactions, dedications, direct takings
(expropriation) of property, tax increment financing, infrastructure and utility fees and
levies [10,15–17]. While some countries have a strong tradition and a range of instruments
to capture value, others are still taking their first steps. Cross-national learning is essential,
because it can provide knowledge and inspire public officials to adopt best practices that
work elsewhere [18–20]. However, a “one-size-fits-all” approach in comparative policy
studies should be avoided, and the optimal tool box has to be adapted to country specific
circumstances [21].
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Value capture instruments mobilize value uplifts and internalize certain positive
or negative externalities caused by development and its approval by government agen-
cies [17,22]. However, before value is tapped by government, it is first created through a
range of market-led, private, or public interventions such as changes in regulation, or via
direct public investment [16,22,23].
The literature on value capture describes its multiple objectives, beyond the overar-
ching goal of internalizing costs and benefits. On the ground, and usually on the local
(urban) scale, value capture is utilized to finance capital improvements [14], as well as new
public services such as linear infrastructure including roads, water pipes, and sewers [15].
Value capture allows governments and municipalities to create a pool of money to finance
a range of other services as well, including the construction of civic buildings and public
facilities [12,24], and to buy (or set aside) land for a variety of public utilities.
Furthermore, value capture tools have been used to generate monetary or in-kind
contributions for the supply of land (or floor space) for public purposes [25]. They are also
designed to deal with the scarcity of land through a range of policy interventions [26]. As
an example, a developer and local government can negotiate on or off-site contributions
of land [18]. Similarly, a developer can agree to supply land for open public space [27] or
childcare facilities [28]. Other value capture tools, such as the community infrastructure
levies in the UK, have been used to finance the building of public schools and parks [29].
2.2. Exactions and Other Pathways for Allocating Public Land through Value Capture
‘Exaction’ is a broad term describing requirements that the developer provide some
kind of public good, including on-site or off-site facilities [18] or cash contributions in order
to obtain permission to build [30]. In the United States, required exactions must be related
to the impact of the development [31] and are used to defray the cost of additional services
required as result of the new development [32]. Exactions can be negotiated voluntarily
with developers or required by strict formulas and legislation.
The literature on value capture has pointed out the unique contribution of exactions
through land readjustment and negotiated contracts to financing urban amenities [33–35].
While exactions through land readjustment are often carried out in accordance with a range
of compulsory laws and rules, negotiations are voluntary and may not be bound by any
legal provisions that limit the discretion of the negotiating parties. Like land readjustment,
negotiated agreements are used “to exact public benefits in excess of what would otherwise
be permitted by regulatory takings rules” [27] (p. 727). In some European countries,
negotiated agreements have secured the provision of social housing on what was previously
private property [22]. In New South Wales (Australia), these agreements have allocated
land for a variety of purposes such as recreational spaces and public parks [36]. In the UK,
contractual obligations paved the way for increasing the amount of affordable housing [37],
for providing rights of way, and community buildings [38]. In the US, they have been
used to provide a range of amenities and to regenerate downtown areas [33]. Additionally,
agreements can require developers to construct the facilities themselves to specifications
approved by the city, and then allocate the completed facility for public use [38] (p. 39).
Critics of these contributions have claimed that they are arbitrary, unequal, and make
some projects unviable by demanding too much from developers [31,39]. Critiques also
focus on the nexus between public requirements (the exaction, fee, or required allocation)
and the property in question. The link between proposed development and the demands
made by the local government is a recurring issue [40]. At times, these demands are
accused of being unrelated to the development or its scale. Specifically, local governments
have been criticized for requiring off-site amenities that are not necessarily linked to a given
project. Municipal requirements are sometimes charged with encouraging profiteering by
government [41]. As the value captured (and the public land that is provided) depends
on land prices, exactions can take place where a single project can generate profits to a
developer or value uplifts in general. Without uplift, the ability to require exactions and
land allocations in general, diminishes. Otherwise, government requirements (such as
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land, cash, or built-up floor space for public use) may reduce the project’s affordability [42]
(p. 110). This situation has led governments to conjure up a range of incentives and
compensation such as density bonuses [43].
2.3. Value Capture, Incentives, and Verticality
The majority of scholarly contributions on value capture and exactions do not link
them directly to verticality, let alone to the ability to join together public and private utilities.
Some scholars, however, point out the link between value capture and densification. For
example, Friendly [28] shows how “in Sao Paulo, within the context of vertical growth
and city expansion . . . developers hoping to build at higher-than-permitted densities may
gain additional floors” due to local legislation that provides bonuses “in exchange for
financial compensation towards social benefits” (p. 2). Some value capture instruments
implicitly assume that value can be created vertically, and land may be provided to the
public in the form of floor area. Several scholars identify the transfer of development
rights (TDR) as a planning tool that facilitates value capture by providing non-financial
compensation to owners [44]. When private (or even public) rights are moved to another
location, developers may receive density bonuses or even enjoy value uplift in the new
location. In exchange, they may be required to provide public benefits in the form of
floor space for public facilities. Thus, the transfer of development rights embodies vertical
possibilities lying dormant in value capture tools, enabling it to accommodate vertical
solutions to urban challenges such as regeneration, climate change, urban sprawl, creating
mixed-use development, and protecting greenfields [45].
However, very few scholarly contributions focus specifically on the ability of value
capture to generate public floor area in mixed-use vertical environs. Nevertheless, experts
have documented this practice in East Asia. For example, in Saitama City (Japan), through
land readjustment, the city’s right to build public facilities on a given plot was converted
into public floor space in a joint private and public venture [46]. Density bonuses, too,
have been particularly instrumental in achieving vertical urbanism [47]. Through rezoning,
re-parcelling, or other measures, these bonuses can encourage the provision of public
services in a vertical-like development that contributes to mixed-use and compact develop-
ment [48]. Existing studies show that this approach is especially evident in transit-oriented
development [49]. For example, in San Francisco, generous density bonuses were given in
one of the most ambitious transportation projects on the West Coast—the Transbay Transit
Center. The project regenerated the surrounding area, created a new transportation hub,
and provided public rooftop parking on top of a train station [50,51].
Likewise, in Seoul, Korea [52], property owners agreed to construct a mixed-use
building in exchange for density bonuses. The building accommodated private and public
spaces (including a pedestrian walkway, plazas, and a garden). In Vietnam, the city of Ho
Chi Minh gave up public ownership to enable the development of a mixed-use high-rise
tower (REE Tower), in which public open space was provided to the city in exchange
for density bonuses [53]. In the United States, cities like Seattle have experimented with
density bonuses to create compact development by enticing developers to incorporate
public facilities in their high-rise buildings [54].
Although the population density in Germany is not as high as in Israel, there is a
general priority for inner-city development in order to reduce suburbanization. For this
reason, several tools—such as urban contracts—have been employed, some of which enable
the vertical allocation of public facilities.
The general framework for urban contracts is regulated in Article 11 of the German
Building Code. The most important group of contracts are the “contracts to cover the follow-
up costs”. They can be used to cover the costs of the municipality in the past or in the future
which are a condition for or consequence of the proposed development. It is generally
accepted that this regulation enables German cities through developer obligations to use
value uplift and recover the cost of social infrastructure like kindergartens and primary
schools [55]. Specifically, Munich was one of the first cities to utilize developer obligations
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which are basically defined in a decision of the municipal council. The city adopted a
‘socially equitable land use policy’ (Sozialgerechte Bodennutzung—SoBoN) in 1994. This
declaration increases the transparency and ensures equal treatment of all those involved.
For this reason, the model has been adopted by many municipalities in the past 25 years.
In general, German developers have to pay for the demand for day-care facilities and
primary schools. The need is determined according to the newly created living space, and
a statistical key is provided for calculating the number of these public facilities. In most
cases, however, larger public amenities are built to cover the demand of the surrounding
area or to achieve reasonable sizes. In this case, the expenses are split and the developer
has to pay for the share of expenses related to her development project.
Developers in Germany have to finance and support said public facilities in one of
the following ways: (1) bear the actual construction costs of the social infrastructure (usu-
ally limited to day-care facilities and primary schools) or (2) replace this obligation with
a proportional financial contribution of EUR100 per square meter of newly created living
space (residential floor space); alternatively (3) developers themselves could take over the
construction of the day-care facilities at their own expense. If the second route of financial
contribution is chosen and the development plan stipulates that the day-care facilities will be
integrated into a larger building (“integrated facilities”), an additional purchase agreement
is required. Usually, the developers build such a facility at the request of the city and
transfer partial ownership to it in accordance with the German Condominium Act (Woh-
nungseigentumsgesetz, WEG). In this case, the city bears the construction costs in accordance
with national standards (DIN). If the public facility is inserted into a condominium, the
floorspace on which it is located has to be provided to the city for free. This is in line with
the principle of transferring ownership of common-use areas free of charge. Furthermore,
the contract must provide a suitable security in the event of the developer’s insolvency [56].
Under the German context, the participation of developers in the construction costs of
the social infrastructure is currently limited to participation in the financing of day-care
facilities and primary schools. A statutory amendment is currently under review as to
whether other facilities should be included or the financial contribution should be raised.
Either way, the total public value capture is limited to 2/3 of the increase in land value. If
higher follow-up costs result, the surplus is to be financed using the municipal budget.
Similar to other countries, value capture instruments in England also enable planners
to finance and provide public amenities that are vertically mixed with private amenities.
Since the early 1990s, the main mechanism of capturing value for the public interest in
England has been through developer contributions [57]. These contributions are made in
accordance with section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, or through the
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) [58].
Both routes can help planners secure contributions to infrastructure, community
facilities or public open space, all of which can be combined with private use of land. The
National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) in England stipulates that obligations of
developers to provide public amenities should be kept to a minimum, applied only when
essential and reasonable [59]. As in other countries, this brings to the fore the question of
correlation between the proposed development and the required public infrastructure, and
the availability of sufficient incentives for developers to sign agreements under Section
106. For example, the planners of the King’s Cross regeneration project managed to link
development to certain public amenities needed in the area. In particular, developer
contributions were used to create floor space for two schools in the Plimsoll Building at
King’s Cross. These schools were incorporated into a residential building while at the same
time alleviating some of the pressure on school development in London. The city procured
these schools through a Section 106 agreement which shows how vertical allocations can
provide a viable solution in dense urban environments, while enabling local government
to become more responsive to fiscal and physical constraints [60].
Notably, while the contributions of developers under Section 106 are based solely
on negotiations and there is no formula provided, the negotiation nevertheless relies on
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a viability appraisal, which is a process of assessing whether a site is financially viable.
This is done by looking at whether the value generated by a development is more than the
Benchmark Land Value. The viability appraisal is a confidential document (not publicly
available), which must be shared with the local authority for negotiation. If viability
appraisals show that it is not financially viable for developers to afford the required public
amenities, the type and scope of contributions will have to be negotiated between developer
and local authority.
Compared to Section 106 agreements, the CIL route is allegedly more transparent.
The developer’s contribution is not based on negotiations. It is calculated per square
meter using a formula and the developer makes cash payments to the local authority. The
calculation involves multiplying the CIL charging rate by the net chargeable floor area
(based on Gross Internal Area) and factoring in an index figure to allow for changes in
building costs over time.
From these examples, it appears that it is possible to link value capture instruments
to policies that increase the availability of floor space for use by the general public. Value
capture can facilitate the vertical expansion of developable land [53], and encourage ancil-
lary benefits such as the creation of a mixed-use city. Negotiated agreements, regulation,
and land readjustment can promote vertically by providing public floorspace in high-rise
developments. These instruments, however, bring about the nexus question between the
city’s requirements, the amenities needed, and the planning gains of the developer.
While some studies tie together vertical urbanism, value capture, and the provision of
public floor space, few describe the regulatory and contractual mechanisms that facilitate
the mixture of public and private amenities in a single location, let alone one building. With
the exception of some countries like the US, Germany and England, the cogs in the value
capture machine remain somewhat concealed. It is unclear how certain public utilities
are produced in a mostly private surrounding. Moreover, it appears that each country, let
alone city, has its own rules (if any) on where and how many public facilities should be
provided in privately owned buildings. Where negotiations between public and private
parties determine the extent of the produced value and value capture, they might result in
random and individual solutions that sit “uneasily alongside the long-standing tradition
of uniformity in land use planning” [61] (p. 86). Where regulations (not negotiations) set
the rules of value capture, their nuts and bolts remain ambiguous too.
Given this knowledge gap, our aim here is to shed light on value capture arrangements
that facilitate the placement of public floor space in private buildings in vertical settings.
We will also analyze the rules and regulatory mechanisms that enable them and unpack
their challenges and shortcomings.
3. Israel as a Case Study
In Israel, local governments use a variety of value capture tools, such as site-specific
floor-area bonuses, and statutory land readjustment. Israel is an interesting case study that
could serve as an inspiration to other countries because of its high growth rate, anticipated
housing shortage, and scarcity of land that pushes the government to provide land for
public utilities using a range of innovative tools. As such, it is an interesting example for
countries facing similar challenges.
Allocations of public floor space in privately owned buildings in Israel can be based on
agreements between developers and local government. On the face of it, these arrangements
are not very different from developer agreements in the UK or joint development ventures in
the US. However, the uniqueness of the Israeli case is that the possible cooperation between
developers and municipalities is enshrined by law in local plans. In other words, this
cooperation is part of the obligatory planning documents, equivalent to zoning ordinances
in the US. In addition, although joint ventures between public and private bodies, public-
private partnerships and similar contractual arrangements are frequently studied in the
literature, there are few studies that explain how public and private cooperation results
in public amenities placed (as floor area) within mostly privately owned structures, let
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alone in a vertical surrounding. We fill in this gap too by looking at the Israeli case. Lastly,
the Israeli case may be of interest to planners in countries with hierarchical, top-down
planning systems. Indeed, vertical allocations in Israel were conceived locally and applied
mostly in local statutes in the Tel Aviv metro area despite the fact that national statutes
did not actually allow local governments to come up with such a solution. As we will
demonstrate, vertical allocations as a subset of value capture solutions have not been
fully institutionalized as a legal provision in the Israeli planning system. They have been
implemented ad hoc by Israeli cities without a comprehensive regulatory framework.
As such, the Israeli case is similar and relevant to transitional economies where “proper
value capture mechanisms to finance public infrastructure are missing” [53] (p. 108). The
investigation of vertical allocations is particularly relevant given calls by international
institutions to improve the capacity of cities to raise public funds and improve the equity
of public planning by providing public amenities through value capture [62,63].
4. Methodology
The study involved three-steps. First, we conducted a desktop-based inquiry into
Israeli local land use plans that include vertical allocations. We searched the Israeli Planning
Administration’s archives using a keyword search for the terms “public floor space,” “floor
space,” “pubic amenities,” “exactions,” and “public services.” As a result, we identified
58 projects in Israel that included vertical allocations.
In the second step, we analyzed the local land use plans associated with these projects.
These are site-specific plans at the plot, block, or the neighborhood level. They are often very
detailed, specifying building rights, height, and land use. They also stipulate the obligations
of developers and conditions for granting building permits. They are not agreements in the
contractual sense, and they are not comprehensive plans either. Nevertheless, they are, in
fact, a piece of local legislation, a statute approved by local or district planning commissions.
We reviewed the provisions of these plans, their embedded mechanisms and underlying
characteristics including the deals they made between developers and the city. This review
included the legislation and court rulings associated with certain projects, and supplementary
material such as real-estate valuation documents and local plans’ supplemental material.
To better understand the mechanisms, considerations and possible pitfalls of vertical
allocations as a value capture tool, in the third step of our analysis, we interviewed dozens
of professionals who are experts in the field of land use planning, law, real-estate appraisal,
as well as public policy. We approached public officials in several municipalities, as well as
experts who work with developers and landowners. Most of the interviews were taped and
summarized. We obtained additional data through personal communication via phone or email
correspondence. In addition, we initiated roundtable discussions with experts to flag key issues
associated with vertical allocations (for a full list of personal communications see Appendix A).
We identified the informants in several ways. Following the first step of analysis, it
became evident that vertical allocations are a frequent occurrence in the Tel Aviv metro
area. Thus, we contacted planners in the district and local planning authorities in the
Tel Aviv region. From there, we used a snowball interview technique to reach out to
other professionals in the central government and the private sector who were involved in
vertical value capture. We were also able to identify possible interviewees from studying
the plans’ documents and noting the professionals and developers who were involved in
discussions on vertical allocations.
The interviews were semi-structured. We asked about the involvement of each infor-
mant in vertical allocations and the underlying reasons for using this tool. We also asked
them whether they could think of similar projects we did not list and how the allocation
actually worked in real life. Specifically, we inquired about the options for taking land (or
floor space) for public amenities, and whether the practice fit the existing regulations. The
answers we received enabled us to describe the mechanism of vertical allocations as well as
alternative mechanisms, and to map their ability to capture value. We present a summary
of these mechanisms in Table 1.
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5. Findings and Discussion
Our survey identified 58 projects approved in recent years, most of which (93%) are
located in municipalities in the Tel Aviv metro area, a central region in Israel that functions
as a cultural and economic hub, and has higher land values compared to other regions.
These projects are regulated by statutory plans approved in 2000–2017. In recent years,
there has been a significant rise in the number of vertical allocation projects (Figure 1) most
of which are located in the center of each city along main roads, primarily in areas where
zoning allows high-rise development.
Figure 1. Number of vertical allocation plans sampled, by year (1993–2017). (n = 58).
Our expert informants suggested that vertical allocations by the city administrations
are motivated by the desire to expedite urban renewal, accelerate private investment in
public facilities, reduce public expenditures, and provide much needed facilities on-site
or off-site. However, the legal mechanisms that create these public spaces in mixed-use
development and the challenges they present remain understudied. We identified a sudden
increase in the number of vertical allocations projects initiated in 2014–2017. Our informants
explained that this happened because city administrations began to recognize the potential
for the value uplift that could be captured through vertical allocations. To take advantage
of this opportunity, they had to perfect the administrative and legal mechanisms (contracts,
training personnel) that enabled the provision of public floor space in vertical environs.
No less importantly, these years witnessed a steady rise in urban renewal projects in inner
cities, and planners needed to create new spaces in these dense urban areas. The scarcity of
land made them think about locating public spaces vertically.
5.1. Mechanisms for Vertical Value Capture
What are the regulatory pathways to ensure vertical allocations? Which value cap-
ture instruments are used for these purposes, and how? The data elicited from existing
regulations and local plans in Israel indicate that there are several options for allocating
floor space for public services. The first is the allocation of actual land area within a given
plot. The municipal authority may take up to 40% of the land surface for certain public
uses without compensation. Second, the city can require developers to cede floor space in
a building that is being constructed. The latter option entails vertical allocation of one floor
or more for use by the project and the nearby community (see Figure 2). The third option is to
require developers to allocate floor space for public amenities in a particular development,
which will serve the project, the neighborhood, and also the city as a whole. In some cases,
and according to the third option, the city may require developers to cede floor space for
future (undetermined) use (see Figure 2).
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3952 10 of 21
Figure 2. Infographic abstract: Pathways for the vertical allocation of public floor space.
At first glance, these pathways suggest that the city has discretion in determining the
type of use, the number of floors, and the potential users of public floor space. However,
we found that this discretion leads to friction between developers and the city. Moreover,
local practices of vertical allocations are quite complex and face quite a few challenges
(see Section 5.2). Current regulations relate only to exacting or expropriating parcels (land
surface). The law remains silent with respect to the ability of cities to take land vertically.
This lacuna has encouraged cities to adopt and formulate local solutions and guidelines
that enable vertical allocations.
As for the legal and statutory mechanisms that enable vertical allocations, we found
that Israeli cities use several tools to capture value in vertical settings (Table 1). The analysis
of local legislation and our interviewees shed light on the different regulatory routes. They
differ in terms of the coercion level they involve, the amount of space provided for public
services, and the secured financial means. The most coercive route is expropriation, while
the least coercive or intrusive is the negotiated agreement.
Most of the vertical allocations we examined occurred through land readjustment
or negotiated exactions. Although formally, and in accordance with the Israeli Planning
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and Building Act, cities can expropriate land and floor space, they refrain from using this
option. Instead, city planners prefer to use land readjustment and negotiations. This way,
cities avoid in-cash compensation, and save money for the taxpayer. In this manner, city
officials argue, the city ensures the provision of public amenities that are inserted into the
built fabric in privately owned structures. The developer retains ownership over most
of the floors, while the city receives title to the one or more floors that are dedicated to
public use.
This mechanism assumes that there is a local (statutory) plan that enables mixed-use
development. The plan is generally backed by a written contract or an implicit agreement
between the owner and the city. At other times, the plan obligates owners to provide floor
space to the city, or else planning approval will not be granted. Our informants indicated
that there are several underlying assumptions embedded in vertical allocations. First, the
city can provide density bonuses to mitigate the costs of constructing the public facilities.
This assumption is based on the understanding that proposed development creates value
uplift that can be harnessed, at least in part, to afford these public goods. Second, the city
can establish a nexus between the proposed development and its requirement for public
floor space (see Section 5.3 infra).
Table 1 shows that vertical allocations can be created using a range of value capture
mechanisms through negotiated or compulsory measures. The latter are used when the city
and the owner or developer of the parcel cannot agree on the contents and the stipulations
of the local plan. The analysis also suggests that existing Israeli regulations are overly
simplistic and outdated. They did not foresee the need for cities to take land vertically.
Although they allow cities to allocate up to 40% of a given land area for certain public
facilities without compensating the owner, they do not deal with the issue of allocating
floor space. In other words, Israeli law assumes that land for public facilities can be taken
primarily by allocating land space, not vertical floor space, within multi-floor buildings. As
such, the law does not suit many urban projects that rely on the densification of the existing
urban fabric. Given this lacuna, Israeli cities have developed local plans that determined
ad hoc vertical allocations of public floor space.
This ad hoc solution has created numerous challenges to cities. Given that they are
forced to operate in a legal limbo, these cities relied on legal advice, professional estimates,
guidelines and municipal formulas to justify the number of square feet allocated in each
project. Gradually, developers and owners became unhappy and argued against what they
regarded as a lack of transparency and the arbitrariness of vertical allocations requirements.
5.2. Growing Critiques of Vertical Allocations
Value capture regulations that allow for vertical allocations create quite a few chal-
lenges. In this section we explain the increasing critiques of vertical allocations and how
city governments have attempted to address them.
Existing regulations gave way to plans inclusive of vertical allocations that appeared
quite random. They varied in terms of the size of the allocation as well as other stipulations
embedded in local statutes. While some projects included a relatively large portion of floor
space for public services, others included a small share of allocation. For example, in the
Tel Aviv metro area there are plans that exact 2160 square meters, while others require
only 300 square meters for a range of public utilities (Figure 3). The size of the allocation is
determined by the city’s planning department, following negotiations with developers or a
strategic planning assessment that provides an estimate regarding the needed public space
that would serve the new development. As Table 1 notes, at other times the city compels
owners and developers to allocate this floor space against their will, thereby passing local
plans without consent.
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Figure 3. A sample of local plans that include vertical allocations in the Tel Aviv metro area.
Figure 3 presents examples of the resulting total built-up floor space in relation to the
building’s plot area (floor area ratio) as well as the total public floor space in relation to
the plot area (public floor area ratio). The data suggest that there are no uniform rules for
allocations across projects and local jurisdictions. Moreover, the share of public vertical
allocations is not directly linked to the total floor area in each building. While in some cases
cities are able to extract more floor space, in other cases, the share of public floor area out of
the total floor area is not significant. Thus, it is safe to say that the developer’s contribution
of public floor space is marginal relative to the entire bulk of each project. When coupled
with density bonuses, it becomes evident that vertical allocations do not create unnecessary
financial burdens. Indeed, the planning apparatus of vertical allocations makes it possible
to reap value uplifts to provide these spaces.
Having said that, the exact size of the allocated space, however, appears is some cases
to be quite random, as it is the result of several factors. The interviews we conducted sug-
gest that the reasons for the different allocations are tied to a variety of factors. These factors
include increasing the value for the developer in a given local plan using different density
bonuses, structural and layout limitations of the plot, the need for a certain type and/or
size of a public utility, the power of the city to negotiate local contributions, the willingness
of the developer to cooperate, and the city’s ability to establish a direct link between the
proposed project and the specific needs of the community and the city. For these reasons,
most city administrations have not established a uniform rule for vertical allocations.
The arbitrariness of local policies of allocation has led to criticism from private owners
on whose property the government sought to allocate floor space for public utilities. In
addition, the national Ministry of Justice has scrutinized cities for their inconsistencies and
lack of transparency in allocating public floor space.
Attempting to remedy the situation, the largest municipality in Tel Aviv’s metro area
(Tel Aviv-Jaffa) has adopted a uniform formula, designed to clarify how much floor space
it would require. The formula is tied to the number of dwelling units or commercial floor
space the developer proposes to build. In addition, to address these concerns, cities have
become more aware of the need to give owners and developers assurances regarding the
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specific use of floor space allocated for public amenities. For example, developers have
required the city to clarify up-front (through an agreement or in local statutes) what types
of public land-uses it would allow in the exacted floor space. They feared that floor space
would be allocated for uses incompatible with their planned development, or that public
floor space would depreciate the value of the land or make marketing a challenge. They
argued that having a public daycare facility is different than having a public funeral home
or offices for treating drug addicts. Indeed, our findings suggest that most land-use plans
(66%) were quite specific in determining the public use of vertical allocations. Moreover,
these plans were quite inflexible in allowing city administrations to change the use of
allocated floor space (Figure 4).
Figure 4. The flexibility of the use of public floor space in local plans inclusive of vertical allocations.
Having said that, our analysis suggests that vertical allocations did not always meet
the expectations of their critics. While developers often argue that cities should cover
the costs of constructing the public floors, city officials assert that the costs should be
borne by the owners and developers. The benefits that accrue to owners as a result of
developing land far outweigh the costs of constructing public floor space, and thus the city
does not need to pay even a share of the costs. According to this argument, if, for example,
a developer builds a new high-rise with 100 new apartments, the development may create
excess demand for schools and other public facilities to support the incoming population.
Why then, city officials ask, should the public at large bear the costs of buying land and
constructing these public institutions? These debates continue to plague the practice of
vertical allocations, and to add to the tensions and unfriendly exchanges between cities
and developers.
Specifically, the latter argue that city administrations deliberately omit the issue of
covering the costs of construction from land use plans. Some local plans were silent or
quite vague regarding the question of who shall pay for building the public floor space
required by the cities. While developers argued that these costs should be borne by the city
administrations, the latter opined that these costs are externalities that should be paid by
the developers, as a marginal cost of the entire development. Consequently, local planners
who drafted these plans stipulated this requirement in the plans’ provisions, or were silent
or vague about it, thereby deliberately omitting any reference to who pays for these floors
(Figure 5). As a result, the debate was left for future negotiations between the city and the
developer at a later phase. This approach can be problematic, because when the parties do
not reach an agreement, vertical allocations might just remain on paper.
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Figure 5. Who pays for the construction of public floors?—Analysis of statutory provisions.
Another problem associated with vertical allocations relates to cases where the allo-
cated public floor space replaces land area owned by the city. We found that in more than
half of the vertical allocations cases, the municipality used to own land before the approval
of the plan. The city gives its land and agrees to a new land use plan, which includes
mixed-use development. Municipal plots and privately owned parcels are joined together,
usually through land readjustment. In fact, municipal land is “reshuffled” with a pool of
existing plots, and comes out as floor space. In this manner, while adding density bonuses,
Israeli cities capture value while ceding control of public land to private developers through
an outright sale, with the condition that public space be integrated into the new building.
Municipal land is sold to the developer and then re-sold to the city as floor space.
This practice involves challenges and pitfalls. First, relative to other owners, the
value of municipal land before and after the allocation should be the same as the value
of privately owned floor space. Second, critics we interviewed argue that the allocation
of public floor space in developments on previously public land is wrong because the
city should not give away land in exchange for vertically allocated floors that will serve a
particular developer. Instead, according to the critique, to avoid accusations of misconduct
and discrimination, the city should offer its land to the highest bidder in order to maximize
its value.
Despite these challenges, it appears that vertical allocations are no different than other
policies adopted by cities around the globe to expedite renewal. In fact, writing about the
South African experience, Santos et al. [64] (2017) find that:
Another case where a municipality may wish to contribute its land as an in-kind
payment is when the land is adjacent to a privately owned site and the public and private
sites can be combined as one regeneration project. Rather than put a city-owned property
up for bid for redevelopment by itself, it may be more beneficial to seek the adjacent
property owner as a development partner. The municipality does not necessarily have to
forego the value of the city-owned site if there are few development constraints and the
municipality is able to get market value for the property (p. 53).
5.3. The Nexus Question and Vertical Allocations
There are several other potential frictions between developers and the municipalities.
The first deals with the area served by the proposed public allocation. Some cities demand
public floor space that will serve the project and its vicinity (neighborhood-level amenities).
Other cities, however, require developers to supply public spaces for use by the whole city
(such as a city library). Their estimates are based on professional opinion or a formula
adopted by the city in accordance with its guidelines. A formula calculates the floor
space a developer would have to provide for public use based on the number of added
housing units or the floor space that is added by the developer for other, non-residential
use. Overall, the estimates are based on municipal planners’ calculations of the incremental
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needs for public facilities associated with the proposed development. Having said that,
we found that developers regard Tel Aviv-Jaffa’s formula as complex, exposing them
to some uncertainty. We also discovered that some municipalities do not use written
formulas that are transparent and known to developers in advance. This is not an unusual
practice internationally, as some cities around the globe have avoided the use of formulas to
extract public benefits under the framework of value capture [28]. As a result, developers
frequently question the tie between the required public floor space and the actual needs
of the city, the neighborhood, or a specific project. This issue, also known to international
readers as the nexus question, is a recurring theme in the value capture scholarship. The
Israeli case provides further evidence on this matter. The vertical environment in which
public floor space is exacted adds a new dimension to this question, as the tie between
private and public amenities become quite evident and even inseparable.
Some vertical allocations are designed to supply public services for the city as a whole.
These requirements might be weakly linked to the project in which public floor space has
been allocated. One example is when a developer applies for a building permit to construct
an office building, and the city requires him/her to allocate one floor for use by the general
public (for example, setting aside floor space for a municipal library). In these cases, the
allocation of floor space does not directly benefit the development. The library does not
serve the users of the proposed office building directly (or solely), though it can create both
positive and negative externalities. Instead, it is required as a contribution towards a new
amenity that serves residents throughout the municipal area. Indeed, Israeli cities are not
alone in dealing with nexus issues, which are comparable to the British experience with
community infrastructure levies [29] (p. 76) or the American experience with municipal
requirements for off-site amenities [40].
Consequently, we found that vertical allocations create a tenuous relationship between
the city and the developer, and between the incentive the city offers and the required
amenity. While some amenities inside mixed-use buildings can create a reasonable collec-
tion of land uses (such as a community center below a residential building), the introduction
of amenities that are regarded as unrelated to the development may stall the project and
its implementation. This is especially true in cases of vertical allocations, where unrelated
amenities have a greater impact on development. For example, Tel Aviv-Jaffa requires
space for municipal offices located in buildings that host privately owned offices. The
allocation of municipal offices might reduce the value of other offices, for example, when
municipal offices are used for social services such as to help alcoholics. Moreover, the city
may find it hard to convince owners or developers that the required municipal offices are
related to the proposed development, and that there is a direct need to provide municipal
offices that stems from the construction of private offices.
The nexus problem is also accentuated by looking at the land uses embedded in
existing plans, and their relationship with the required public floor space. Developers
opine that the need for most public floor space (for example, schools) is dependent on
residential development and additional housing units. We found that developers argue
that the need for public floor area in a given project can be extracted and justified only by
linking each public allocation of built-up space to private floor space and, specifically, to
apartments. This is because apartments increase population density, which can place more
demands on nearby public spaces. Cities, however, argue that the requirement for public
floors can also stem from other types of development, including projects that contain the
non-residential use of land. This is why we found that cities have approved public floor
space in a range of local plans, each of which includes a mixture of a variety of land uses
in the same building (Figure 6). Thus, vertical allocations are not pegged to residential
zoning alone. Having said that, being aware of this critique, it still appears that most local
plans require public floor space in buildings that contain residential use (Figure 6). Put
differently, in practice, vertical allocations are approved where it is easier to create a nexus
between the public demand and the private amenity.
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Figure 6. Number of local plans, sorted by type of private uses mixed with public floor space (n = 58).
The question of “relatedness” is as complex when certain requirements for vertical
allocations are designed to mitigate the effects of other projects in the nearby neighbor-
hood. Here, the nexus question touches on the mitigation of externalities as well as on
considerations of social justice and fairness. One example is when a developer builds
new apartments and is therefore required to set aside floor space for kindergartens that
would serve the proposed project as well as a nearby development that had not previously
provided public floor space. In these circumstances, the city faces criticism (and legal
challenges), with developers arguing that they should not bear the brunt of the costs by
providing floor space that should have been provided by other developers in the vicinity.
These issues become more contentious when vertical allocations are set per project, and
not according to predetermined formulas or strategic planning. No other Israeli city (except
Tel Aviv) uses a formula that is based on professional assessments. Even with a formula,
developers argue that its application is unclear or flawed. Furthermore, developers claim
that the incentives received (or offered) by cities do not correspond with appraisals of the
development’s viability. In addition, they maintain that the city planners’ analysis of the
financial viability does not correspond with the real costs of developing public floors or
the actual needs of the city. As a result, the requirements that the cities say they need
are regarded as rather capricious. This argument is not unique to Israel, as international
experience shows that assessments about financial viability are often questioned despite
their technocratic aura [65].
6. Conclusions
This paper brings to the fore the ability of value capture to create vertical solutions
in an urbanizing environment. The link between value capture and vertical development
has not been sufficiently established by the existing literature, let alone its ability to bring
together public and private amenities within the same project. It is our hope that the Israeli
case can open the door for future research on this matter, which explores the mechanisms
used across jurisdictions to create mixed public-private floors in the same project, as well
as the challenges associated with this policy.
The ability of local government to sustain itself in the long run, to form strategic
partnerships or to implement policies that save government funds, provide critical services,
and improve amenity- all contribute to achieving sustainable urban governance. This is
achieved through vertical allocations as an attractive strategy for reducing acquisition
costs for public land. Vertical allocations are useful for deriving additional investment,
especially in high-growth areas, where land values are relatively high. They work best
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in situations where the private development generates sufficient profit and value uplift
that can be reaped in whole or in part by the city. Vertical allocations often entail density
bonuses, which developers may or may not accept. Some allocations are determined
without consent, while others occur through public-private cooperation. Either way, as the
size of population increases in urban areas and land becomes scarce and more expensive,
planning has largely been about reducing development pressures, and supplying public
facilities and infrastructure in the urban core. Vertical allocations, together with other value
capture tools, have been harnessed to achieve these goals.
Although Israeli cities have experimented with vertical allocations, they have not
always managed to block complaints coming from owners and developers. A key problem
has been the lack of overarching legislation that empowers cities, creates transparency,
spells out the conditions that allow vertical exactions, and facilitates the forfeiture of city
plots in exchange for floor space. The missing regulatory framework poses quite a challenge
in the context of value capture [53,66]. On one hand, the regulatory void creates room for
local practices and rules, such as the ones created by some Israeli cities. On the other hand,
it might lead to controversies. As we demonstrated, a vertical allocations program that
leaves developers unaware of the long-term use of public floor space can cause discontent.
A vertical allocation policy that is unclear, leaves room for negotiations, and does not assign
roles and responsibilities could antagonize owners. In a similar vein, vertical allocations
that do not address the nexus question can lead to disputes. Allegedly, in vertical settings,
it is easier to link public and private floor space, and to assign the public use of certain
floors to private needs in the same project. However, the Israeli case demonstrates that
even within site-specific projects, the nexus question has still many tentacles. It rears its
head because of the city’s aspiration to create more value for the public by linking private
initiatives to citywide needs. Better policies should therefore not only stress transparency
and accuracy, but also linkage: between a particular project and the required floor space;
between a given project and externalities; between profit and public exactions; and between
value creation and value capture.
Despite this and other caveats, city administrations in Israel have been able to establish
their own practice by using a range of value capture tools to shift a larger share of public
costs to private developers. As such, vertical allocations are an alternative source for the
capital financing of new public facilities. Today they are used to secure a range of other
goals as well, such as mixed-use projects, compact development, and the creation of urban
spaces that bring public amenities closer to private users. These benefits, however, are
dependent on harnessing the market, and on developmental logic. In areas where there is
no marketable land, or where land cannot generate value uplift, this collaboration between
public and private actors cannot take place. Cities that rely on entrepreneurial urban
governance arrangements may benefit from vertical allocations. Local governments across
the globe that lack financial resources and the revenues to provide public infrastructure
and facilities might want to consider the Israeli case (with its pros and cons) when devising
their own policies and regulations.
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Appendix A. List of Interviews and Personal Communications
1. Interview with an urban planner. City Planning Department, & Engineering Admin-
istration, Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality. 16 March 2017.
2. Interview with a (second) urban planner. City Planning Department. Tel Aviv-Jaffa
Municipality. 16 March 2017.
3. Interview with a (third) urban planner. City Planning Department. Tel Aviv-Jaffa
Municipality. 16 March 2017.
4. Interview with a consultant and planner, Tel Aviv District Planning and Building
Committee. 16 March 2017.
5. Interview with senior legal consultant, Haifa metro area. 24 April 2017.
6. Interview with a senior financial consultant in a local municipality, Gush Dan Area,
24 April 2017.
7. City planner and planning consultant in the city of Bnei Brak. 24 April 2017.
8. Interview with senior planner in Petah Tiqwa municipality. 1 May 2017.
9. Interview with a senior financial consultant in a local municipality, Gush Dan Area,
9 May 2017.
10. A telephone conversation with a senior legal advisor in a local municipality in the
Gush Dan Area. 14 May 2017.
11. Interview with a municipal planner, Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality, 24 May 2017.
12. Interview with a Deputy Mayor in a city located in Gush Dan Area 2 July 2017.
13. A telephone conversation with a senior planner, Bat Yam Municipality. 26 July 2017.
14. A telephone conversation with a city planner, working in a private planning office.
1 August 2017.
15. Interview with the Director of the Senior Division of the Ministry of Education.
17 August 2017.
16. A telephone conversation with a senior planner, Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality 10 Septem-
ber 2017.
17. Interview with a senior real estate expert, Ramat Gan Municipality, 24 October 2017.
18. Interview with architect in city planning department, Ramat Gan municipality. 24
October 2017.
19. Interview with an architect in the city planning department, the municipality of Beit
Shemesh. 29 November 2017.
20. A telephone conversation with a senior appraiser. 14 December 2017.
21. Interview with a senior appraiser. 3 January 2018.
22. Interview with a senior appraiser representing entrepreneurs in urban renewal
projects. 3 January 2018.
23. Interview with a senior manager in the city’s property department in the center of the
country. 16 January 2018.
24. A telephone conversation with a senior legal adviser in a government ministry. 31 Jan-
uary 2018.
25. Roundtable discussion on vertical allocations with the following experts: Senior legal
advisor in Tel Aviv’s planning commission, an expert real estate appraiser, and a
municipal planner working for a municipality in Tel Aviv metro area. 4 February 2018.
26. A telephone conversation with a law professor, Israeli college of management. 8 Au-
gust 2018.
27. Roundtable discussion on vertical allocations with several experts; Senior planner
(retired) in Tel Aviv’s District Planning Committee; senior real-estate appraiser in
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the Israeli Ministry of Justice; the deputy president of Israel’s Builders Association;
head of a municipal real-estate department in a municipality in Tel Aviv metro area.
15 December 2019.
28. E-mail correspondence with a real-estate appraiser who was involved in a vertical
allocations project. 17 December 2019.
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